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I. PROJECT BACKGROUND 
C6queza is one of six rural development projects initiated 
by the Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA) j.n 1971. Its 
name is taken from the major municipality and market town which 
serves as the center for nine rural communities in the eastern 
portion of the Department of Cundinamarca, southeast of the 
ca?ital of Bogo,t6. The project was conceived as an experi- 
mental program to reach small farmers, based upon studies of 
other projects with similar goals, and visits in 1970 by ICA 
central and regional staff to the Puebla Project in l.1exico. 
The ICA commission to Puebla returned to Colombia convinced 
of the value of experimental plots conducted on small farmers' 
land to transfer technology and increase productivity. They 
were also convinced of the need to transcend productivity con- 
siderations and create an integral development approach which 
combined social and economic considerations. Both have been 
objectives of the C6queza Project. 
ICA was given responsibility over all extension services 
of the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture in 1967. It per- 
forms basic aqricultural research as well -- mostly at 
ICA Headquarters at ~ibaitat6 near ~ o ~ o t s .  ICAassistance 
to small farmers is coordinated with other ~olombian government 
agencies which provide credit (the Caja Agraria), and land 
distribution and titles (INCORA, the Agrarian Reform Insti- 
tute). The Cgqueza Project is directed by cn ICA regional 
staff of 16 professionals and subprofessionals, assisted by 
research and evaluation support from the Canadian government's 
International Development Research Centre (ZDRC), which has 
maintained two full-time professionals in Colombia since shortly 
after project initiation. 
The Spanish language abbreviation is PDROC, taken from P r o y e c t o  de 
D e s a r r o l l o  d e l  O r i e n t e  de  Cundinamarca. 
The project area embraces nine communities with 12,218 
families farming 561,184 acres. A total of 976 farm families 
with land holdings of 5249 acres are considered to be the 
project participants. 
11. LOCAL ENVIRONNENT 
- 
The nine communities forming the Cbqueza-project are com- 
posed of mountain-side farms, ranging in altitude from 3,000 
to 10,000 feet. To a visitor driving into Cgqueza, there 
does not appear to be one square acre of level land in the 
entire area. While 64.5 percent of all farms are below 12.4 
acres in size, 42.3 percent of the total area is made up of 
farms with 74.1 or more acres -- suggesting a wide diversity 
between the many small farmers and the few very large land 
holders in the region. Average.annua1 income in 1972 was 
estimated at $645 per farm family with 7.5 members -- a per 
capita income of $86. 
Of the 976 farm families assisted by the project, 42 per- 
cent have five acres or less, while none of the participants 
have more than 7..4. This was a requirement when the project 
was initiated, since it was directed spec.ifically at small 
f arner s . 
Colombia is one of the more developed countries in the 
Third World and both the ICA staff and the farmer partici- 
pants in the project reflect this advancement. ICA is reported 
to have more than:150 PhD1s trained abroad on its staff, and 
corres2ondingly larger numbers of well-educated and trained 
holders of lesser degrees. In addition, ICA operates a rural 
development school offering masters degrees as part of its 
~ibaitatg Headquarters. Farmers in Cdqueza were using large 
amounts of fertilizer on certain crops before the project was 
initiated. Credit is of great importance to small farmers, 
since, as will be shown, cash is not available for necessary 
inputs; thus, the maintenance of a good credit rating is con- 
sidered essential. The Colombian government has made a good 
deal of credit available to small holders and there are pri- 
vate sources which almost all small farmers in the Cdqueza 
area draw upon. 
S i n c e  t h e  u s e  o f  c r e d i t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  r i s k  o f  t h e  fa rmer  
i n  y e a r s  o f  bad h a r v e s t ,  repayment w i l l  b e  d i f f i c u l t  and a  
s u b s i s t e n c e  i n c o n e  b a s e  may b e  t h r e a t e n e d ;  c r e d i t  i s  o n l y  ! 
used when a b s o l u t e l y  n e c e s s a r y .  However, c r e d i t  i s  common 
among C6queza s m a l l  f a r m e r s  f o r  p o t a t o e s ,  o n i o n s ,  t o m a t o e s  
and o t h e r  c r o p s  which r e q u i r e  c a s h  i n p u t s .  Farmers  are v e r y  
r e l u c t a n t  t o  u s e  c r e d i t  f o r  c o r n ,  which  c a n  b e  grown w i t h o u t  
s i g n i f i c a n t  c a s h  i n p u t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t o  minimize  t h e  pos- 
s i b i l i t y  of  l o s s ,  f a r m e r s  w i l l  grow many d i f f e r e n t  v a r i e t i e s  
of t h e  same v e g e t a b l e ,  e .g .  b e a n s ,  s i n c e  some b e a n s  are resis- 
t a n t  t o  f r o s t ,  some t o  d r o u g h t ,  some t o  r a i n ,  - etc.  
While 50 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  a r e a ' s  f a r m e r s  have  comple ted  
one  t o  t h r e e  y e a r s  o f  p r imary  e d u c a t i o n ,  e s t i m a t e s  o f  func-  
t i o n a l  l i t e r a c y  a r e  much lower .  Land t i t l e s  are h e l d  by n e a r l y  
70 p e r c e n t  of  a l l  f a r m e r s ,  and t h o s e  who r e n t  l a n d  have  r e a -  
s o n a b l e  s e c u r i t y  t h a t  t h e i r  p l o t s  w i l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  i n  f u t u r e  
c r o p  c y c l e s .  
111. DYNAMICS: IDEA EVOLUTION AND PROJECT DESIGN 
A f t e r  t h e  I C A  commission r e t u r n e d  from P u e b l a ,  a  p l a n  
bras developed which was t o  become t h e  Ca'sueza p r o j e c t .  The 
a r e a  was chosen  because  o f  t h e  l a r g e  number of  s m a l l  f a r m e r s  
w i t h  low income l e v e l s .  I t  moved ahead on t h r e e  f r o n t s :  f i r s t ,  
beg inn ing  i n  e a r l y  1971,  t h e  p r o j e c t  s t a f f  began a  campaign 
t o  u n i t e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  l o c a l  m u n i c i p a l i , t i e s  (which c o r r e -  
spond t o  d i s t r i c t s  o r  s u b c o u n t i e s )  i n  a n  a t t a c k  on r u r a l  
p o v e r t y .  The p r o j e c t  he lped t o  o r g a n i z e  m u n i c i p a l  development 
c o u n c i l s ,  c o ~ p o s e d  of  f a r m e r s ,  c l e r g y ,  businessmen and a l l  
l o c a l  government  l e a d e r s  i n  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  m o b i l i z e  r e s o u r c e s  
behind t h e i r  new campaign. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e y  a t t e n p t e d  t o  
work w i t h  s m a l l  f a r m e r s '  g r o u p s ,  o r  c o u n c i l s ,  a s  one  l e s s o n  
from Pueb la  was t h e  s u c c e s s  i n  working t h r o u g h  s m a l l  farm 
u n i t s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  f a r m e r s .  Al thoush  l o c a l  
non-farm r e s o u r c e s  have p l a y e d  a minor r o l e  i n  t h e  p r o j e c t ,  
t h e  a c t i v i t y  h a s  c o n t i n u e d ,  w i t h  s c h o o l  t e a c h e r s ,  v o c a t i o n a l  
t e a c h e r s  and many o f  t h e  b e t t e r  e d u c a t e d  c i t i z e n s  i n  t h e  marke t  
towns of t h e  r e g i o n  t a k e  p a r t  i n  some e x t e n s i o n  programs,  
meet w i t h  f a r m e r s  on p rc -a r ranged  d a y s  and o r g a n i z e  t h r e e -  
day workshops i n  a n  a t t e m p t  -to .improve t h e  t r a n s f c r  of t ech-  
n i c a l  knowledge t o  p r o j e c t  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
The second e f f o r t  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  was s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  
e x t e n s i o n  s e r v i c e s  by f u l l - t i m e  s t a f f ,  o f f e r e d  on m a r k e t  d a y s ,  
a t  community f a i r s  and i n  p r i v a t e  homes. Wherever and when- 
e v e r  f a r m e r s  c o n g r e g a t e d ,  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  w e r e . o r g a n i z e d  and 
f a r m e r s  pe r suaded  t o  a t t e n d .  I n  a l l ,  i n  t h e  e i g h t  months 
between March and October  1971,  t h e  p r o j e c t  s t a f f  e s t i m a t e d  
they held nearly 200 meetings, with a total farm attendance 
of over 7000 persons, more than half of them males. The 
extensionists were offering the technological knowledge gained 
at the Tibaitatd research station, on improved seeds, plant- 
ing densities, fertilizer use, weeding, insecticides, fungi- 
cides, etc. In addition, home economics and nutrition were 
discussedwith rural women. 
Interlocked with the promotion activity was the actual 
demonstration of improved techniques on land held by small 
farmers, inputs and technical assistance being supplied by the 
project. In 1971, 19 plots were conducted, seven 1196 square 
yard plots in corn and twelve 478 square yard-plots in pota- 
toes. No special incentives were required to obtain farmer 
cooperation. Results from the trials on small farmer land 
were good, but adoption rates were estimated to be low by 
project staff. 
Although it was undertaken in 1972, the creation of baseline 
data on the project area can be considered as the third part 
of the evolution and design of the project. Baseline data 
were created by a survey of more than 600 farm families, and 
included very detailed demographic, social and economic studies. 
Some of the nost useful information concerned the cropping 
associationsland the relative percentages of the farmers' 
land devoted to particular uses. Subsequent reevaluation of 
the income data obtained as a result of the farm surveys re- 
vealed that it was unreliable, due to farmers' reluctance to 
offer income and expense data to government representatives. 
In summing up the evolution of the project, staff are 
inclined to tall< and write about a decided lack of enthusiasm 
by small farmers for the technolocjical knowledge being offered 
by the project. There were several reasons: previous INCORA 
attempts in the same area in the recent past had aroused 
farmers' fears that their land was to be confiscated by the 
government. INCORA apparently had attempted to institute a 
land consolidation scheme to end the fragmentation of plots 
scattered in many parts of the valley. This lead to a good 
deal of initial resistance by farmers to cooperation with the 
ICA/C6queza staff. 
Second, farmers in thc arca arc hiqhly inclcpcndcnt, and 
oftcn politicized. The usc of organized groups lor thc dis- 
semination of technical knowledge did not seem to be effective 
Instead, natural leaders, from among the more qroaressive. 
1 e .cj. corn and beans, or potatoes and beans, grown' together a t  the 
same time. 
of the small farmers were identified and used to conduct 
local meetings, demonstration plots, and in general provide 
a transmission line between project staff and the rest of 
the small farmers. Third, technical recommendations, based 
upon the central research stations results, were only par- 
tially suited to the small farners in the area. ICA hybrid 
corn grew well at some altitudes, but poorly at others. 
Both potatoes and corn were grown as single crops in the 
demonstration plots, and this method was encouraged by the 
fCA staff. However, local farmers had a long-established 
practice of intertwining both corn and potatoes with beans 
or sone other legume, and were not especially interested in 
single-crop demonstrations. As a result of the first year's 
effort, the C6queza staff reevaluated its methods, and 
reoriented the program for the 1972 cropping season. 
IV. DYNAMICS : PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
Adopting the Technology to the Region 
The project was designed to be reiterative, so that pro- 
ject staff could learn from each year's interaction with the 
small farmer clients. Beginning in 1972 the staEf attempted 
to adapt the technolocgical recommendations being offered by 
ICA Headquarters in Tibaitatd to the specific land and environ- 
ment of farners in Cgqueza. There were 39 test plots that year, 
15 in corn mixed with beans, 13 in potatoes and 11 in cash 
crop vegetables (onions, cabbages, tomatoes, lettuce, etc.). 
The tests utilized not only ICA hybrid seeds, but local 
varieties. 
The results were clear: depending upon the altitude, 
the hybrid corn could produce more than 3.5 to 1 over tradi- 
tional methods, while the simple use of the recommended pack- 
age on local varieties could increase output more than 2.5 to 
1. For potatoes and vegetables, it was found that the recom- 
mended fertilizer doses and planting densities, etc., were 
already being followed by .the local farmers, or could be  
accepted without difficulty. Only for corn, the main staple, 
was there significant resistance to adoption of new methods. 
There were major problems in getting the farmers to accept 
high cash costs to pay for the recommended inputs on a crop 
which they could grow without those inputs, although at a 
greatly reduced yield per acre. This led to a series of 
special studies conducted by the IDRC advisors and ICA staff 
on the determinants of adaptive behavior among local small 
farmers in new corn technology. 
These s t u d i e s  were conducted  under  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
IDRC p r o f e s s i o n a l s  (an a g r o n o m i s t ,  economis t  and a n t h r o p o l o -  
g i s t )  w i t h  I C A  s t a f f  members s t u d y i n g  f o r  advanced d e g r e e s  
a t  t h e  I C A  r u r a l  development  g r a d u a t e  s c h o o l ,  a s  w e l l  as  w i t h  
t h e  I C A  r e g i o n a l  s t a f f  i n  C6queza. T h i s  combinat ion  produced 
s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s e a r c h  r e s u l t s  on  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n s ,  c o n s t r a i n t s  
and b e h a v i o r  changes  o f  s m a l l  f a r m e r s  i n v o l v e d  i n  development  
p r o j e c t s .  A few o f  t h e  more i m p o r t a n t  c o n c l u s i o n s  were: 
s m a l l  f a r m e r s  i n  Cdqueza had c a s h  av-ail- 
a b i l i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  which e l i m i n a t e d - t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u s i n g  t h e i r  own f u n d s  for  
t h e  c a s h  i n p u t s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  more pro-  
d u c t i v e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  t echno logy ;  , 
s m a l l  f a r m e r s  had a c c e s s  t o  c r e d i t ,  and 
n e a r l y  a l l  drew upon c r e d i t  s o u r c e s :  
government ( 3 0  p e r c e n t  of f a r m e r s ) ,  com- 
m e r c i a l ,  and p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s  (59 
p e r c e n t  o f  f a r m e r s )  ; 
t h e  r e a l  c o s t  o f  c r e d i t  was found t o  be  
much h i g h e r  t h a n  s t i p u l a t e d  i n t e r e s t  rates 
when costs o f  l o a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t ime  
s p e n t  i n  p r o c u r i n g  t h e  l o a n ,  h o s p i t a l i t y  
and b r i b e s  o f f e r e d  t o  l e n d e r s  and co- 
d e b t o r s  were i n c l u d e d ;  f o r  government 
bank l o a n s  t h e  s t i p u l a t e d  a n n u a l  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  o f  1 3  p e r c e n t  r o s e  t o  a real c r e d i t  
c o s t  o f  2 4  p e r c e n t ;  and  
l a b o r  s h o r t a g e s  d u r i n g  peak p e r i o d s  
r e f l e c t e d  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o s t s  o f  employ- 
ment e l s e w h e r e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  f u l l  employ- 
ment i n  t h e  farm s e c t o r  i n  ~ g q u e z a ;  t h e r e  
were no  major  l a b o r  s h o r t a g e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
t o  a d o p t i o n .  
I n v e s t i g a t i n g  C o n s t r a i n t s  t o  Adoption 
Using tl-rc c o n s t r a i n t s - t o - a d o p t i o n  apy~roach ,  t h e  p r o j e c t  
b e g m  i n v c s t i q a t i n y  c o r n  producers' responses t o  the now- 
proven t echno logy .  C r e d i t  s t u d i e s  i n  1972 d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  o f  
t h o s e  f a r m e r s  who drew c r e d i t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  c o r n ,  8 6  per-  
c e n t  adop ted  t h e  p r o j e c t ' s  p l a n t i n g  d e n s i t y  recommendations 
(which i n v o l v e d  no c a s h  costs, b u t  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  b e h a v i o r  
change from t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  me thod) ,  b u t  o n l y  22 p e r c e n t  
follorved t h e  e x p e n s i v e  f e r t i l i z e r  dosage  r e c o i h e n d a t i o n s .  
T h i s  was r a t h e r  c o n c l u s i v e  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  cgqueza small farm- 
ers, i n  t h e  absence  of  c r e d i t  or l a b o r  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  would n o t  
f o l l ow  proven recommendations on a  c r o ?  which cou ld  b e  yroy#:l 
w i thou t  i n c u r r i n g  c a s h  c o s t s ,  even when n e t  income i n c r e a s o  -; 
of  o v e r  200 p e r c e n t  had been demons t ra ted .  
With t h e s e  d a t a  i n  hand, t h e  p r o j e c t  assumed t h r e e  d i f -  
f , f e r e n t  t a c k s :  f i r s t ,  it a t t emp ted  t o  s i m p l i f y  t h e  recommended 
i n p u t  s chedu l e ,  d ropp ing  f e r t i l i z e r  a p p l i c a t i o n s  from t h r e e  
t o  t w o  and t h e n  t o  one a t  t h e  beg inn ing  o f  t h e  p l a n t i n g  c y c l e .  
Second, it a t t emp ted  t o  improve e x t e n s i o n  t e c h n i q u e s  -- more 
farm v i s i t s ,  g r e a t e r  u s e  o f  r e s p e c t e d  f a rmer s  t o  s p r e a d  t h e  
word i n  t h e i r  a r e a  of i n f l u e n c e ,  g r e a t e r  u s e  o f  l e a d e r s  i n  
t h e  market  towns t o  a t t e m p t  t o  conv ince  small f a r m e r s  o f  t h e  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  new t e c h n i q u e s .  While t h e s e  new a t t a c k s  on 
t h e  problem made headway, t h e y  s t i l l  f a i l e d  t o  s o l v e  t h e  
problem. A second s e r i e s  o f  s t u d i e s  t h e n  a t t emp ted  t o  f o c u s  
on t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n s t r a i n t s  su r round ing  t h e  u s e  of  c a s h  
i n p u t s  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  c o r n .  
The p r o j e c t  found t h a t  u s e  of  t h e  recommended method 
i n c r e a s e d  c a s h  c o s t s  from $21 t o  $142 or n e a r l y  s i x  t i m e s .  
S i nce  c a s h  was n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  make t h e s e  payments from t h e  
fa rmers '  own s a v i n g s ,  t h e  c r e d i t  costs o f  t h e  r e c o m e n d e d  
package ( a t  t h e  s t i p u l a t e d  1 3  p e r c e n t )  was $21 -- e q u a l  t o  
t h e  t o t a l  c a s h  requ i rement  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p r o d u c t i o n  
method. Re tu rn s  t o  c a s h  a s  a  f a c t o r  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  dropped 
w i t h  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  recommended package.  
The f a r m e r ' s  r i s k  f u n c t i o n  was c a l c u l a t e d  a s  t h e  expec ted  
va lue  of t h e  l o s s  which might  be i n c u r r e d  from a d o p t i n g  t h e  
r ecomended  package,  u s i n g  b o t h  t o t a l  p roduc t i on  c o s t s ,  and 
ca sh  o u t l a y s  a l one .  W h i l e  c a l u l a t e d  r i s k s  on t h e  t o t a l  i n -  
ves tment  more t h a n  doubled, t h e  r i s k  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c a s h  
i n p u t s  i n c r e a s e d  1 5  t i m e s .  When h e  borrowed money for t h e  
r e comended  package,  t h e  fa rmer  assumed a  r i s k  l i a b i l i t y  of 
$21.46,  a sum r e p r e s e n t i n g  23 p e r c e n t  o f  h i s  p e r  a c r e  annua l  
income. The f a rmer  u s i n g  t r a d i t i o n a l  p roduc t i on  methods 
i n c u r s  a  r i s k  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  o n l y  $ 1 . 3 2 ,  which he can  o f t e n  
r a i s e  from h i s  own s o u r c e s .  The ID~C/Cgqueza S t a f f  r e p o r t  
concluded:  
The above a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  r e s i s t a n c e  
t o  accep t ance  o f  t h e  recommended p r o d u c t i o n  
methods l i e s  i n  t h e  h i g h  i n i t i a l  c a s h  r e q u i r e -  
1 
The r i sks  involved are some combination of physical production 
risk -- the increased variance of y ie lds  a s  t o ta l  y ie lds  increase -- 
and the problems of moving from the farmer's own financial  resources t o  
credit .  We understand that the physical variance of tne new corn tech- 
nology in  a l l  cases (after  the f i r s t  year which selected out some hybrid 
corn seeds) gave greater yie lds  than did traditional methods, that i s ,  
above 801.6 pounds per acre. 
rnent, the low returns to cash invested 
and the high risks related to the change. 
Acceptable recornendations must apparently 
satisfy a set of requirements that are 
defined by the producers community. The 
lack of knowledge of researchers and 
planners of action programs about these 
conditions and their relation to the 
rural community, has probably been the 
overriding reason for the failure of- 
new production technologies in the 
small farmers' community. I 
An Experimental Output-Sharing Scheme 
The next step in the encouragement of corn adoption was a 
natural extension of the findings of the first three years' re- 
search. The IDRC advisors suggested and financially supported an 
experimental output-sharing program, initiated in the corn season 
of 1974, of two and a half acres each for 2'$ small. farmers in 
~;queza. For a $10 joining fce, the project would supply the 
farmer with technical assistance as well as all cash inputs 
required for the recommended package (valued at $42.90 per 
acre), while the farmer furnished the land and all labor 
requirements (valued at $41.30 per acre). The farmertakes 
the first 1760 pounds of output, after which the farmer and 
project shared the output equally. The plan was expected to 
return $68 in cash equivalent to the farmer, a 185 percent 
increase over the return to traditional subsistence methods. 
In addition, risk is reduced, returns to cash are up. The 
plan was designed to work against the major identified con- 
straints to the adoption of the recommended package. 
Since harvest begins in late October and extends through 
December 1974, no reports on the final outcome of the plan 
are yet available. The project had not yet resolved problems 
over accurate measurement of farm output, and a concern for 
the farmer's reliability in delivering the entire output to 
be shared. In the traditional conpazia system, cheating on 
creditors is an accepted method of readjusting the overly 
high interest rate, and if this system is extended to the 
1 
I G Zandstra, Two Corn Production Systems in the ~squcza Project, 
a paper prepared for the ~griculture, Food and Nutrition Science Field 
Staff Syrrposium of the International Development Research Centre ( I D R C ) ,  
Ottawa, November 18-21, 1974, page 9. Details of the expected loss 
function are included in this paper. 
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project, it will represent an ~ninten~ional subsidy to :he , 
farmer. At this time there is no final evaluation of this 
limited experiment. 
However, long before the new corn season has begun, there 
have been numerous inquiries and requests by CAqueza's small 
farmers to join the plan next year. If yields are as expected 
there will be a return to the plan (to the project) over and 
,above costs, which could put it on a self-sustaining basis 
in the future for all expenses except technical extension 
services. As the new corn production method moves into its 
fourth and fifth years, farmers adopting the new techniques 
will become less dependent on the extension service. 
Complementary C6queza Project Activities 
While in-depth research and experimentation with corn 
producti0.n was ongoing, the CSqueza project staff was conduct- 
ing a variety of other programs with the small farmers. 1 
By 1973 there was a clear realization that the gerceptions 
of the farmer, his view of the constraints and profitability, 
must be a major input to changes in rural production be- 
havior. To reflect this knowledge, several organizational 
changes were made in the Cdqueza project. The Investigations 
Division (agricultural and livestock) was combined with the 
Popularization Division (the extension service), and both 
were decentralized. The subprofessionals were noved from the 
market town of Cdqueza out into the nine municipalities, and 
given broad responsibility for four to six districts within 
.each municipality. The project felt that the interaction 
with small farners, the ability to communicate and be con- 
vincing, were more L~portant attributes than specialized 
technical knowledge. 
As one additional project activity, the Hone Improvement 
Division, especially concerned with nutrition, health and 
child care, continued its training of wives of farners. A 
study involving a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer separated those 
nutritional deficiencies which were correlated with income 
(protein and calories) from those which were not (calcium 
and vitamin A) and which could be dealt with through nutri- . 
tional education programs. 
The ~ s q u e z a  s t a f f  have a l s o  assumed the r o l e  o f  extension agents i n  
supplsrt o f  the Caja Agraria, t'he Colombian govcrnmrnt's bank which lends t o  
fanners. Project  s t a f f  h e l p  prepare the farmer's loan papers, act ing  a s  an 
interface  with bank o f f i c i a l s .  The s t a f f  es t imates  t h a t  each approved loan 
requires  four v i s i t s  t o  the individual  farm by t h e  ICA e x t e n s i o n i s t .  
b 
& 
The Establishment of a Marketing Netw1:)rk - 
A farmers' consumers cooperative was formed as one outgrowth 
of the local municipa.1 development councils, promoted by the 
project in 1971. The farmers felt that consumer 
goods were too expensive, and decided to organize a local 
cooperative. Since cooperatives in this part of Colombia 
have not been successful, projeot staff were less than enthu- 
siastic, but finally agreed to support the farmers' requests. 
The raffle of a cow started the capitalization, and with this 
initial money purchases were made in bulk from Bogotb. This 
has grown, over time, to include agricultural input purchases. 
The cooperative had 180 small farmer members in early 
1974. More important than its size was the fact that it 
allowed an organized voice for small farmers, and provided 
a focus for a marketing scheme. 
Project staff had been promoting the profitability of 
garden vegetable plots which required high cash inputs but 
yielded very high net income returns. When the staff recorn- 
mended the planting of cabbages, many farmers complied the 
next season. When the price of cabbages fell below the labor 
cost of harvesting and transportation, the farmers dumped 
them onto the main highway as an explicit indication of the 
worth of the project's recommendations. 
With major support and seed money from the IDRC advisors, 
the project then initiated a marketing scheme which was just 
beginning to take effect in 1974. Research established that 
in cgqueza neither farmer nor trader had an advantage, since 
excess truck capacity and too many buyers reduced profits 
all around. The project set o i i t  to establish a marketing 
network with the other ICA clients around ~oqot6, usina a 
warehouse and purchasinq arranqements with 20 of the city's 
independent stores. This effort had little farmer involve- 
ment, except in the demand for its operation. 
Marketing is a very complex and specialized field in 
Colombj.a, necessarily involving many areas such as Cdqueza 
in order to insure a continual flow of garden vegetables to 
the major market in BogotS. Grading and packaging are two 
of the most important aspects of the marketing plan, and 
these are done at the warehouse in ~ogot5, not in Cbqueza. 
V. PROJECT SUCC:TSS 
The project has determined and then demonstrated, under 
small farmer conditions and constraints, that major net in- 
come increases of fo percent are possible (from $645 to $963 
for the average farm), and has affered the necessary exten- 
sion services to spread knowledge of new techniques. Since 
potatoes presented an insurmountable problem to the Cdqueza 
staff (it is the lack of the highest quality potato seed 
which prevents greater income increases with this crop), and 
since garden vegetable production was increasing signifi- 
cantly (so long as marketing facilities could be assured), 
the major constraint to increased small farmer income was the 
continuing importance of the corn crops and low corn yields. 
The attack on corn productivity created an experimental crop- 
sharing program which seems to be a model which will work 
among small farmers. 
The project had a budget of $109,000 in 1974, and was 
aupented by both professional staff and operating funds from 
the IDRC. Over the course of a five-year program (1972-76) 
the project is scheduled to receive $575,000 (again omitting 
the IDRC contribution). This is a significant amount for 976 
farmers ($590 per farm family), and can be justified only as 
an experimental research program design to improve all ICA 
research and extension methods. Seen in that context, the 
effort and expense at CSqueza is a miniscule proportion of 
ICA's and Colombia's overall agriculture budget. 
ICA has both extension and research responsibilities, 
and one part of the project involved determining how best to 
work with small farmers. The reiterative process began with 
the assumption that research results at ICA's headquarters at 
~ibaitat6 near Boyot6 were applicable to C6queza.It became clear 
this was not the case, and after long and difficult regional- 
versus-national headquarters battles, ICA Headquarters has 
instituted research on crop associations, and ordered the 
decentralization of the staff for all rural development pro- 
jects along the lines developed in Cdqueza. Thus to the ex- 
tent that the results of CSqueza have improved the state of 
knowledge of the entire ICA organization, the projcct has been 
successful. 
: As concerns small farmers, if the 1972 adoption rates 
in corn technology as very conservative figures are applied 
to 1974, the $12,400 in corn loans will bring in additional 
net income (over traditional techniques) of $2781, which 
represents a 253 percent increase in net income per acre (for 
the adopters). Adding in the $68 per acre increase in net 
income from the 20 farmers in the experimental crop-sharing 
program, as  w e l l  as  a n  e s t i m a t e d  50 p.:rcent i n c r e a s ?  o v e r  p r e -  
p r o j e c t  area p l a n t e d  t o  g a r d e n  v e g e t a : > l e s ,  t h e  p r o j e c t  has  
g e n e r a t e d  a n  a n n u a l  income i n c r e a s e  o f  f o u r  p e r c e n t  t a k e n  ' , 
o v e r . 9 7 6  f a r m e r s .  T h i s  c o u l d  be  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n c r e a s e d  i f  
modern c o r n  t e c h n o l o g y ,  t h e  major  component o f  t h e  Cdqueza 
p r o j e c t ,  i s  w i d e l y  a d o p t e d .  The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  income g a i n s  
i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  a c t u a l  b e n e f i t s  i n  1974. 
I n  o t h e r  areas t h e r e  have  been some improvements ,  b u t  
t h e y  are h a r d  t o  measure  o r  q u a n t i f y .  The c o o p e r a t i v e  s t i l l  
re l ies  upon p r o j e c t s '  volume buying and p r i c i n g  of  consumer 
goods and a g r i c h l t u r a l  i n p u t s ,  as w e l l  a s  p r o j e c t  m a r k e t i n g  
of  g a r d e n  v e g e t a b l e s .  A g r e a t  e f f o r t  h a s  been made t o  con- 
t a c t  t h e  small f a r m e r s  i n  m e e t i n g s ,  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s ,  f a i r s ,  
workshops,  e tc . ,  by  s t a f f  as  w e l l  a s  by  community and educa- 
t i o n a l  l e a d e r s .  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  r e s i s t a n c e  by ~ b q u e z a ' s  
s m a l l  f a r m e r s  t o  f o r m a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  h a s  l e d  t o  t h e  u s e  of 
i n f o r m a l  l e a d e r s h i p  g r o u p s ,  and a g r e a t  r e l i a n c e  upon c o n t a c t  
between p r o j e c t  s t a f f  and i n d i v i d u a l  farm f a m i l i e s .  These 
a re  p r o v e n  b u t  h i g h - c o s t  methods o f  s p r e a d i n g  modern a g r i c u l -  
t u r e  t echno logy .  
V I .  PROJECT LESSONS FOR DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The major  l e s s o n s  o f  t h i s  p r o j e c t  a r e  w e l l - s t a t e d  i n  t h e  
p r e f a c e  t o  t h e  I C A - I D R C  1974 r e p o r t :  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  r e s e a r c h  a t  b o t h  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  i s  s t r o n g l y  o r i e n t e d  
towards  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  chanqe.  Much of  t h i s  
r e s e a r c h  s e e k s  t o  d e v e l o p  components o f  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  sys tems  o r  comple te  
p r o d u c t i o n  s y s t e m s  which w i l l  i n c r e a s e  food  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  from improved a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t i o n .  
The e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  Cdqueza p r o j e c t  i s  
t h a t  much o f  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  e f f o r t  i n v e s t e d  
i n t o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  r e s e a r c h  may 
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  improve t h e  we l l -be ing  of 
t h e  s m a l l  f a r m e r ,  u n l c s s  t h e  - t e c h n i c a l  inno-  
v a t i o n s  a r e  nccoinpanied, a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  
f i rs t  i n s t a n c e ,  by a comparable e x p e n d i t u r e  
on a c t i v i t i e s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  f a r m e r s '  
l i m i t a t i o n s  t o  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of  r e s e a r c h  
r e s u l t s  i n t o  t h e i r  p r o d u c t i o n  sys tems .  1 - 
The ~ i q u e z a  Project ,  p r e f a c e  to f o u r  r e p o r t s  preparcd by t h e  ICA-IDRC 
i n t c r d i c i p l i n a r y  team for t h e  ~ g r i c u l t u ' r e ,  Food and N u t r i t i o n  S c i e n c e  
F i e l d  S t a f f  Synposium of t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development Research Centre  
(IDRC) November 16-21, 1974.  The a u t h o r s  of t h e  paper  were C.A. Z u l b e r t i ,  
Ronald J. Duncan, Hubert G .  Zandstra and Kenneth G .  Swanberg. 
In Cdqueza, the project staff haci to learn to iist.en t n  
the farmers; this was the first real step toward improved 
adoption rates for corn. But when the farmers reported that 
"credit" and "marketing" -- rather than technology and pro- 
ductivity -- were their main problems, this information did 
not automatically obviate difficulties. "Credit," it was 
learned, was the farmer's way of talking about a risk function 
involved in high cash inputs in a crop he can grow without 
cash requirements. The provision of more credit specifically 
for corn did not solve the problem. More "marketing" was not 
a solution; rather, too much marketing appeared to be respon- 
sible for the low price paid to farmers by middlemen. A 
marketing system which worked to capacity was one answer, but 
this required arrangements which could not be expected from 
small farmers themselves. 
In 1974 the C6queza project represented one of the best 
researched and most responsive extension efforts seen by the ! 
DAI team. And yet, after four years of dedicated effort, I 
there was still much to be accomplished. However, cornnunica- 
tions had been opened between project staff and small farmer, 
\ 
and the process established whereby each year's lessons were 
being translated into next year's project redesign. In the 
I 
I 
complex world of Colombian small farmers, this is probably 
i 
the only way a project could interact with, and actually 1 I
increase the well-being of small farmer participants in rural 
development. 
Other lessons of the project concerned evaluation systems 
and the methods used to collect baseline data. The original 
1972 survey data results gave a per capita income 02 $50; 
this was revised to $86 by utilizing expenditure data, and 
the project now estimates this figure is approximately 20 per- 
cent too low. In Colombia, survey methods which zttempt to 
record wealth or income run into strong opposition from small 
holders who are suspicious of the purpose of the data collec- 
tion. While the project has excellent data on net income 
potential from proven modern packages as well as books of 
statistics on meetings, demonstrations, extension contracts, 
ctc., it has virtually no information on the number of adopters, 
the acreage changes as a result of adoption and total output 
and income increases as a result of project endeavors. The 
evaluation system has focused on the "why" questions, and 
there is no systematic attempt to answer the-fundamental ques- 
tion of "how many" are receiving benefits or to attempt to 
quantify benefits other than those under cor~trolled conditions 
in the project. 
Finally, the project.has demonstrated a need to take 
account of non-technological decisions of small farmers, 
building upon the constraints they face and the potential 
benefits they perceive. It has also launched an innovative 
experiment which a t tempts  t o  work d i r s c t l y  a g a i n s t  .':he' 
reasons why farmers do  n o t  adopt new ,.~nd "proven" a g r i c u l -  ' 
t u r a l  methods and p r a c t i c e s .  However, it has y e t  . t o  dafinc. ,  
a s  t h e  p r o j e c t  s t a f f  most r e a d i l y  admit,  an oper.ationa'lly 
proven s o l u t i o n  which w i l l  t ake  account of these  c o n s t r a i n t s  
and which w i l l  have a broad-ranging and p o s i t i v e  impact on 
l a r g e  numbers of smal l  farmers  i n  r u r a l  Colombia. 
Information Sources 
A. Field 
ICA Headquarters at ~ibaitati were visited four times in 1974. 
Discussions were held with the Csqueza project director, who later became 
the overall director for Region I, which includes Csqueza; Drs. Zandstra 
and Swanberg of the IDRC staff and Wallace Hawkins, the education advisor 
to ICA (supported by a grant from the Kellogg Foundation). Csqueza was 
visited by two DAI staff on 7 and 8 May, and discussions were held with 
all project personnel, as well as with the U.S. Peace Corps volunteer 
working on the nutrition study. 
B. Reports 
A large number of research reports have been written on 
Ciqueza. Three of the most useful were: 
The afore-referenced ICA-IDRC Report to the Field 
Staff Symposium of IDRC held in November 1974; 
Luis Alfonso Chudt L. and Kenneth G. Swanberg, 
Evaluation de Las Estructuras Institucionalizadas 
en 10s Proyectos de Desarrollo Rural, ~otoga', 
October 11, 1974; and 
German Escobar Paez, Proyecto de Desarrollo Rural 
del Oriente de Cundinamarca: Diagnostico Socio- 
Economico, ~ogot;, July 31, 1973 (the baseline 
socioeconomic study). 
Data Adequacy 
While the yields, net income, factor costs and returns, and other 
aspects of the benefits of the recommended technological packages, along 
with the risk calculations, have been elaborately documented by the pro- 
ject, the number of beneficiaries (adopters) had to be estimated. 
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VALLE DE CAUCA, COLONBIA 
I , C , A a  RURAL DEVELOPMENT P I L O T  PROJECT FOR NORTHERN CAUCA 
I. PROJECT BACKGROUND - 
The Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA) is the agency 
responsible for Colombia's agricultural research and farm 
extension services. The successor to a series of research 
and extension institutions dating back to 1952, ICA was organ- 
ized in 1969 as a semiautonomous entity. It employs some 
5350 people, administers 25 research centers and experimental 
stations and operates 47 so-called "rural development agencies" -- essentially farm extension service offices. 
In cooperation with the Caja Agraria, the nation's largest 
agricultural lending institution, ICA began in 1971 to organize 
pilot rural development projects in 20 selected areas of the 
country. Inspired by the Puebla Project in Mexico, which ICA 
representatives visited in 1970, the purposes of these rural 
development pilot projects were: 
to transfer adaptive agricultural research 
activities out of sophisticated experiment 
stations and into the fields of small 
farmers ; 
to develop high-yield technological pack- 
ages appropriate to small farmer produc- 
tion environments; and 
to organize these producers in local groups 
through which credit, technical assistance, 
and other services could be more efficiently 
channeled. 
No less than $7.8 mill.i.on of n $28 million Colombian 
Agricultural Sector Loan has been made available I>y AID to 
finance ICA's rural development program. 
The first ICA rural development project was established 
in the ~olornbian highlands near 3ogotd (see Cdqueza project 
write-up), the second in a middle-altitude vaJley of south 
central Colombia. This is the Northern Cauca Project, launched 
in March 1972. Headquartered in'the small market town of 
Santander de Quilichao (population circa U000) , the Ca~ica , 
Project is directed at a small farm population of some 38,000 
families whose land holdings range fr:,m one-half to 25 acre& 
(0.2 to ten hectares), with an average of four azre's (1..5 ' ' 
hzctares). These producers are scattered over il rural dis- 
tricts and are clustered in an altitude .zone of about 2500- 
4000 feet above sea level, where, because of river water avail- 
ability and favorable rainfall patterns, most farmers can 
practice a double-cropping cycle. 
Of the 38,000 farm units within the project's zone of 
influence, the project claims to directly or i-ndirectly bene- 
fit 3100. Some 250-500 participants (the number varies per 
crop cycle) receive credit to finance cash crops with modern 
inputs following project recommendations. Most of these pro- 
ducers are organized in 14 base organizations. 
The thrust of the project concerns applied agronomic 
research and education. From the beginning, ICA staff have 
tested improved crop varieties against traditional strains 
to determine which yield best under small farm production con- 
ditions. These so-called "regional tests" have involved such 
cash crops as yuca, beans, soybeans, corn, rice, sugar cane 
and vegetables. Additionally, fertilizer, fumigation and plant 
density trials on these crops have been conducted on demon- 
stration plots. Both activities take place on the land of 
small farmers. 
Where especially positive results are obtained, the pro- 
ject organizes "field days" (usually at harvest) to expose 
local farmers to the benefits of a newly-proven technology. 
This activity is supplemented by crop-specific courses pre- 
sented to the membership of farmer base groups. Over the 
first 18 months of the project, ICA staff carried out 43 demon- 
stration plots, 47 regional tests, 20 crop courses, 24 field 
days and 776 meetings with base group membership. 
The ICA project is not restricted only to agriculture. 
It also provides the region's small farmers with assistance 
on livestock raising. To date assistance has included educa- 
tion and veterinary services relating to dairy cattle, pigs 
and poultry. Additionally, some 800 wives of small farmers, 
organized in 12 motherst clubs, meet weekly with ICA paratech- 
nical home economists for training in nutrition, health, child 
care, domestic arts and other subjects. 
In all, the ICA project office in Santander de Quilichao 
employs a project staff of four professionals and 16 subpro- 
fessionals. In the first category-are three agronomists (in- 
cluding the project director) and a veterinarian. Of the sub- 
professionals, 13 are agricultural technicians assigned to 
field supervision and promotion tasks on a district basis, 
and three are females with special training to work with rural 
mothers' clubs. Most of the subprofessionals have completed 
primary and some secondary education. It is noteworthy that 
the Director of the Northern Cauca Project has served as the 
local farm extension agent in Santander de Quilichao since 
the late 19501s, and several of his agricultural technicians 
' have served under him for a decade or more. 
11. LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 
The North Cauca region contains some of the best agricul- 
tural land in all of Colombia; it also contains some of the 
worst. In the first category are the wide, flat bottomlands 
of the Cauca Valley itself. These are abundantly supplied 
by river watersand are perfectly suited for mechanization. 
Perhaps 70 percent of this superb agricultural real estate 
is controlled by large and medium farmers operating modern, 
coriimercial -- even agro-industrial -- rice and sugar cane 
haciendas or cattle ranches. These properties extend to the 
base of the Andean foothills at the northern end of the Cauca 
Valley, where Santander de Quilichao is located, and then as 
the landscape beings to pitch upward, one encounters much 
poorer and more heavily crowded farm land: that held by most 
of the region's small farmers. 
About 60 percent of these producers are owner-operators, 
cultivating properties which on the average do not exceed 
five acres (two hectares). An additional 30 percent of farms 
are worked by renters and ten percent by squatters. The land 
of the small farmers is severely eroded in some areas, and 
hundreds of plots have been abandoned for this reason alone. 
Soils tens to be seriously. depleted on most properties due 
to limited use of fertilizer and over-cultivation resulting 
from the progressive fragmentation of holdings. 
The region's small farmers are commercially oriented, 
and perhaps as much as 90 percent of their production is 
destined for market sale. However, cash crop specialization 
is not common since farmers prefer to spread their risks by 
growing a wide variety of products, including tree crops such 
as plantains, coffee and citrus. They attempt to supplement 
their crop income with 1i.vestock ci~tcrprises on a small scale. 
Off-farm employment on lowland haciendas is widcsprcad. Tra- 
ditionally independent and self-relient, the typical farmer 
is reluctant to solicit public agricultural credit with which 
to finance yield-increasing modern inputs. Consequently, 
cash crop yields are far.below what they need to be to pro- 
vide rural families with a means of escaping subsistence-level 
living standards. 
Credit resistance by Northern Caucals small fz~rrners i~ 
not due to ignorance; 85 percent of rural adult males are 
able to read and write. Nor is it t11e result of rsstrictec 
access to public credit sources; to the contrary, credit rs 
available almost for the asking. In Santander is located 
a large office of the Caja Agxaria, Colombia's oldest and 
largest agricultural lending institution. The Caja is fairly 
liberal in its credit policies and has few qualms about lend- 
ing to small farmers. For example, it will lend not only 
to farmers with land titles but also to those without, in- 
cluding renters and squatters. To qualify for credit, renters 
must have contracts limited to no less than three years; 
squatters are required to have occupied their property for 
ten years. 
Of course, the Caja's generosity ends abruptly when a 
client fails to repay his loan on time. The bank's interest 
rate of 13 percent per annum is automatically doubled on 
all loans delinquent by more than 30 days and doubled asain 
at 60 days. Moreover, foreclosure proceedings begin at 6-12 
months unless justifiable cause can be shown for inability 
to pay. This is not just an idle threat; many foreclosures 
have in fact been carried out. 
It is worth mentioning that the Caja has also been in 
the farm supply business for decades. Indeed, much of its 
credit is provided in kind -- fertilizer, insecticides, seed, 
implements -- rather than cash. Combined with the demonstra- 
tion effect created by the lowland haciendas, which at some 
tine or another have employed most of the region's small 
farmers as wage laborers, the Caja has been instrumental in 
generalizing knowledge if not use of modern inputs through- 
out Northern Cauca. But given small farmer resistance to 
bank credit, many producers have no way of financing recom- 
mended input use levels and therefore fail to derive much 
benefit from them. This is perhaps the single most im2ortant 
problem which the staff of ICA must overcome if their pilot 
project is to succeed. 
Unfortunately, the problem is getting worse rather than 
better. Between 1972 and late 1973 the price of Caja-distributed 
fertilizer (the cheapest supplier around) rose from $7.60 
to $10.30 per 110-pound (50-kilo) baq and despite a temporary 
price freeze on existing stocks which was imposed in December 
1973, the world energy crisis is sure to eventually force 
the price of this commodity much higher. 
111. DYNAMICS: IDEA EVOLUTION AND PROJECT DESIGN 
Like its counterpart rural development projects elsewhere 
in Colombia, the Northern Cauca'project was the outgrowth of 
a visit by ICA representatives in 1970 to Plan Puebla in 
Mexico. These representatives returned with the convlcti~n 
that the Mexican project, innovative' though it was, did not 
go far enough. Focused essentially on raising the corn c:*c~ 
yields and income of small farmers, it ignored the develop- 
ment of integral strategies for attacking other problems such 
as health, housing and nutritional inadequacies of the rural 
poor. 
The Colombians vowed to be more ambitious; they began 
to talk about launching "multidisciplinary" and "multi-insti- 
tutional" and "multi-crop" activities. Northern Cauca was 
selected as an appropriate region to convert-these slogans 
into action for several reasons. First, the ICA farm exten- 
sion agency in Santander de Quilichao was directed by a dynamic 
and respected agent, the kind of person that could be expected 
to "get results" quickly. 
Second, due to its proximity to Cali, the project could 
draw upon a large number of public service institutions which 
might potentially be recruited for research and assistance 
activities directed at small farmers: universities, the 
Forest Service, the Federation of Coffee Growers, the Public 
Marketing Corporation, the regional offices of the Ministries 
of Housing and Health, etc. Third, the project region did 
face a terrible array of problems characteristic of many 
underdeveloped farming regions in Colombia, such that strate- 
gies and solutions proven effective in Northern Cauca might 
be replicated elsewhere. 
Ostensibly for purposes of developing a project design 
which would innovatively cope with the region's priority 
problems, ICA staff undertook a socioeconomic survey based 
on a sample of 140 small families from five representative 
rural districts. Because it was conducted by agricultural 
professionals schooled in the methodologies of conventional 
farm extension, it is not surprising that the survey failed 
to generate a very novel strategy for assisting small farmers. 
In effect, project planners decided to continue basically 
with the services that the farm extension agency in Santander 
de Quilichao had been offering for many years: promotion 
of cash crop production using modern inputs, veterinary and 
educational attention to livestock raisers, and home economics 
training for rural women. 
Indeed, the only innovations offered by the project were 
borrowed from Puebla: 1) project services would bc directed 
exclusively at small farmers of 25,acres (ten hectares) or 
less, and 2) existing crop technologies developed on ICA 
experimental stations would be tested, under small farm con- 
ditions, against prevailing traditional technologies. 
In other words, the project strategy was a conventional 
extension with a Puebla-style focus. It was more ambitious 
than Puebla only in that it did not restrict its research 
efforts to just one crop, and chose to scatter its energies 
over a broader range of activities. But in doing so, the 
Northern Cauca project sacrificed much of its potential use- 
fulness as a pilot undertaking. 
IV. DYNAMICS: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
- 
Faithful to their slogan of encouraging "multi-institu- 
tional" approaches, Northern Cauca project staff attempted 
to recruit the cooperation of as many as 12 government and 
private service agencies in a joint enterprise to organize 
and assist small farmers. Representatives of these entities 
showed high initial interest in the project, and over a two- 
month period in early 1972 ICA arranged numerous meetings with 
small farmers in the rural districts; dozens of would-be 
change agents from Cali arrived to make glowing speeches 
about their plans for integral socioeconomic development of 
the farm population. Some 19 rural development base groups 
were organized in short order. 
However, problems of maintaining their continuity quickly 
surfaced. In the first place, only two of the 12 cooperating 
agencies bothered to continue meeting with the base group. 
Simultaneously, ICA was criticized for organizing base groups 
in the first place. Why organize new groups, the farmers 
complained, when they already belonged to old ones that had 
been active for years? Such groups, ICA discovered, were 
many: community action associations, civil defense groups, 
"friendship" credit and consumer clubs, burial societies, 
and sports clubs -- to name a few. 
Faced with such institutional competition, ICA staff 
elected to drop their plan to work only with base groups they 
had organized, opting instead to work through existing entities 
wherever they were active and forming new groups where older 
ones were absent. However, there were no local objections 
to o,rganizing mothers' clubs, of which nine were initially 
established. -- 
ICA1s next task was to recruit small farmers willing 
to volunteer part of their holdings for the establishment 
of regional tests and demonstration plots. When the project 
promised to pay all input costs of these experiments and 
allow their operators to keep all products harvested, many 
volunteers were found. The project was thus'able to pick 
and choose among them, usually selecting those farmers located 
on roads who offered the highest potential "visibility." 
As was the experience in Puebla, Northern Cauca project 
staff discovered that traditional crop strains used by small 
farmers performed equally or better than many of the more 
delicate hybrids imported from the experimental stations. 
With increased planting densities assisted by moderate to 
heavy fertilizer applications, yields on corn could be in- 
creased by 50-60 percent and those of yuca doubled. Bean 
and soybean yields demonstrated increases of 33 percent and 
17 percent respectively. During the project's first crop 
cycle -- June to December -- regional tests were conducted 
on 40 small farms in all: ten for yuca, nine for beans, 
eight each for corn and soybeans, and five for vegetables. 
During this period 13 demonstration plots and 12 field days 
were conducted, together with 91 field meetings with farmers. 
Also four courses in vegetable growing and three in yuca were 
organized. 
However, the project was pushed too quickly for its own 
good and managed to get the cart before the horse. For even 
as it was developing a set of suitable technological packages 
on small farm experimental plots, it launched a campaign to 
get small farmers to request credit for cash crop production 
(and animal purchases) before these packages had been proven. 
ICA staff, in dialogue with small farmers, helped them to 
prepare farm production plans and credit requests for Caja 
financing. The practices recommended were straightforward: 
fertilize, fertilize, fertilize. On this basis 521 farmers 
received cash crop loans for 2626 acres (1063 hectares) 
totalling $145,200, mostly for growing corn, soybeans, and 
yuca. Yield increases on these crops matched those attained 
on the experimental plots. 
Unfortunately, by harvest time in late 1972 market prices 
for these products had fallen sharply. Although all loans 
were repaid on time, most producers did little better than 
break even. Unlike the Puebla project, where the marketing 
problem had been solved by government price support to the 
promoted cash crop, Northern Cauca project staff had left 
small farmers to fend for themselves at harvest tine. In 
the process, the potential income gains from increased pro- 
ductivity were lost, which only served to reinforce the small 
farmer's traditional reluctance to assume the risks of bank 
credit. 
The consequences of having pushed too fast with too much 
were immediately felt during the first and second crop cycles 
of 1973. Project participation not only sagged but so too, 
apparently, did the energy of project staff. In 1973 the 
number of regional tests dropped to seven. In the first 
crop cycle there were 18 demonstration plots and nine field 
days; in the second cycle 12 and three respectively. The 
number of credit recipients supervised by ICA staff dropped 
by half: 225 in the first cycle and 232 in the second. 
Yields on corn and soybeans were maintaned. Yuca yieids sained 
an additional 50 percent, but this outcome only affected 41 
producers. No marketing services were organized, however, 
and even today this area of activity remains conspicuously 
neglected by the project. 
The only areas of the project which seem to have main- 
tained their initial momentum are those of livestock promo- 
tion and.mothersl club activity. In the project's first crop 
cycle, nine courses on poultry and one each on pig and dairy 
cattle raising were held. Some 270 farmers attended, of 
which 59 received Caja Agraria loans totalling $26,500 to 
finance the purchase of 99 dairy cows, 52 pigs and 2700 chic- 
kens. With respect to mothers' club activities, nine groups 
totalling 800 members held 820 meetings for courses on vege- 
table gardening, sewing and wgaving. It is noteworthy that 
17 women received Caja Agraria loans, 13 to purchase sewing 
machines, three for weaving looms and one to finance her vege- 
table garden. 
In 1973, another nine livestock courses with 250 parti- 
cipants were organized in the first crop cycle; six courses 
had an attendance of 129 in the second. Animal loans totalling 
$25,000 to 38 fanners in the first cycle and $24,700 to 33 
in the second were granted. During these periods the number 
of mothers' clubs was increased to 12. However, Caja loans 
to women were terminated, and with this impediment ICA home 
economists turned their efforts to non-income-generating pro- 
jects: courses in nutrition, baby care, personal hygiene 
and first aid. 
Unfortunately, at the time the project was visited no 
date were yet available on its 1974 performance. But it is 
likely that project activities have declined even further, 
in view of the high cost of modern inputs resulting fron the 
world energy crisis. The energy crisis is bound to make 
ICA1s technological packages, based as they are on intensi- 
fied use of modern inputs, much less attractive to small 
farmers, especially in the absence of efforts to solve the 
marketing problem. 
V. PROJECT SUCCESS 
It is hardly appropriate to make a definitive judgment 
on the success of the Northern Cauca project on the basis of 
its performance during a brief 18-month period. However, 
the available evidence'suggests that it has accomplished far 
less than it hoped to. By pledging themselves to exceed the 
accomplishments of Peubla, ICA-staff in Santander de Quilichao 
' .  . . . , ., H-25 I 
. . 
attempted a much broader range of activities than their Mexi- 
can counterparts, but delivered less in net benefits to small' 
farmers , 
I C A  did overcome the resistance of many project parti- 
cipants to bank credit, but this victory proved ephemeral, 
mainly because one of the basic lessons of Puebla was ignored: 
namely, increased productivity is no automatic guarantee of 
increased income in the absence of marketing arrangements 
which offer the small farmer remunerative prices for the crops 
he sells,' Moreover, despite the proliferation of ICA-super- 
vised experimental plots on small farms, these efforts dem- 
onstrated little continuity after the first crop cycle in 
which they were attempted, and were sequenced inappropriately; 
consequently, credit promotion was launched prematurely. 
It is tempting to conclude, from the available data, 
that the project was never truly committed to the idea of 
adaptive research on small farms in the first place, but went 
ahead with its regional trials for their symbolic value rather 
than because it was felt they would generate technological 
breakthroughs. Northern Cauca does claim substantial yield 
increases for those project participants who received crop 
loans to finance increased levels of fertilization, but pro- 
ject staff concedes its figures are based on field staff and 
small farmer estimates, not -- as in Puebla -- on careful 
yield sampling surveys at harvest time. In sum, the project 
has so far done very little to prove itself either as a pilot 
project or even as a model for conventional farm extension. 
VI. LESSONS FOR DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Nonetheless, the project offers many useful lessons. 
First, the project demonstrates that organizing farmers in 
base groups is a fine idea if the client population lacks 
pre-existing institutional affiliations of its own; but where 
farmers.have already organized themselves it is often wise 
to work through them rather than start from scratch with new 
institutions. ICA staff in Santander now admit that they 
can get far better mileage out of working with rural sport 
clubs than with any group they themselves have organized. 
When the project wants to drum up attendance for crop and 
livestock courses or field days, it often gets the word out 
fastest by sending its staff to attend or compete in local 
soccer matches in the rural districts. 
A second lesson involves the questionable advisablity 
of launching a new rural development project with veteran 
staff from conventional farm extension services. The Northern 
Cauca pilot undertaking demonstrated an apparent lack of com- 
mitment to implementing those features of the project design 
I .  which in any real sense could be considered "inno~ative.~ 
However, those activities which had been conducted for years 
were continued unchanged and apparently absorbed most of the 
energies of the staff. 
.. A' The project also demonstrates that it is possible -- 
indeed quite easy -- to get immediate yield increases on 
small farms from the introduction.of fertilizer. However, 
it is quite another matter to convert these increased yields 
into sustained income gains without facing up to the really 
hard questions of how to achieve remunerative price levels 
for the increased output generated. At the local level this 
may entail group storage and marketing arrangements. At the 
regional or national level it may entail the creation of 
price support policies, federal marketing agencies and other 
institutional infrastructure characterized by the requisite 
administrative agility and efficiency to establish staying 
power. 
In brief, the challenge lies not in how to produce a 
discrete leap in cash crop productivity; it lies in assuming 
that such productivity, once achieved, can be sustained over 
time. 
Other "negative" lessons of the project should be apparent 
and need only be summarized briefly here: 
the failure to address the marketing 
problem; 
premature credit promotion; 
. lack of continuity in the adaptive research 
activities; and 
neglect of a reliable methodology, such 
as that used in Puebla, to collect yield 
data on the harvests of project credit 
recipients. 
In general, the Northern Cauca project appears to be 
an'undertaking which was designed and implemented with no 
clear commitment to get there. It appears-to be an effort 
to make business-as-usual look like something more than it 
is or could ever become: namely, a pilot project. 
Information Sources 
A. Field 
The Northern Cauca project was visited for two days by one DAI 
s taf f  member in  June, 1974, a t  which time the project director was not 
available, due t o  i l lness.  However, extensive conversations were held 
with two project professionals, one f ield supervisor and one home economist. 
Two rural  d i s t r i c t s  were visi ted,  where conversations were conducted wi th  
the farmers of one base group and members of one mothers club. 
- 
B. Reports 
The A I D  Agricultural Sector Loan Paper (Colombia: 514-L-064) was 
consulted for an overview of I C A  rural  development p i lo t  projects i n  
general; also a brief Northern Cauca project description by Ernesto Navia G . ,  
the project 's director,  i n  Memorias ( l e r  Seminario  International d e  
P r o y e c t o s  d e  D e s a r r o l l o  Rural Reg iona l ,  S e p t .  10-19,  19721 ,  published by 
I C A .  Data o n  project ac t iv i t i e s  were drawn from Northern Cauca's Informe 
E s t a d i s t i c o ,  compiled on a bi-annual (crop cycle) basis. 
na ta  Adequacy 
Numerical data on project ac t iv i t i e s  and participant: loans, yields, 
acreage, etc., are a l l  taken from published documents or  project f i l e s  
ci ted above. 
